While aggregate data do not show the investment echoes predicted by vintage-capital models, echoes arise in rates of entry and exit of firms at the industry level. Moreover, industries where prices decline rapidly experience early 'shakeouts'. The relation emerges naturally in a vintage-capital model in which exit of firms sometimes accompanies the replacement of their capital, and in which a shakeout is the first replacement 'echo' of the capital created when the industry is born.
Introduction
shows that industries where prices decline rapidly experience early 'shakeouts' -simultaneous exits of a fraction of incumbent firms. Data also show repeated echoes in entry and exit in several industries.
We set up a vintage-capital model that explains this relation. We argue that producers sometimes exit an industry when their capital comes up for replacement. Replacement is optimal when there is capital-embodied technical progress. Before its optimal replacement date, the sunk costs in the capital stock will keep a firm in the industry. But at the replacement date, the firm may no longer be as efficient as some other potential adopters of frontier technology, and will choose to exit. Viewed in this way, a shakeout is but an 'echo' of the burst of investment that occurs when an industry comes into being.
If one can associate a shakeout with capital replacement, then the pattern in Figure 1 follows immediately: Where technological progress is more rapid, prices fall faster and capital is replaced more frequently. The Klepper (1982, henceforth GK). 1 The pattern is that the shakeout occurs earlier in those industries in which technological progress -as measured by the rate at which its product price declined prior to the shakeout -is faster. 2 As we shall show, the same pattern arises in subsequent echoes -the faster the technological progress, the more frequent the echoes.
Ours is primarily a model of investment echoes. To make it a theory of exit echoes then requires explaining why capital replacement may sometimes cause exit. Our explanation is that as firms age, they sometimes lose the ability to implement new technology (which in turn is embodied in new capital). The assertion is roughly that 'old dogs can't learn new tricks'. We do not explain why they cannot, we instead parameterize this tendency in the form of a hazard rate of losing implementation skill exogenously and randomly. 3 A loss of implementation skill does not induce an exit 1 GK measure an industry's age from the date that the product was commercially introduced, i.e., from the date of its first sales. The shakeout period is defined as the epoch during which the number of firms is declining. GK say that an 'exit' occurs when a firm stops making the product in question, even if that firm continues to make other products. GK time the start of the shakeout when net entry becomes negative for an appreciable length of time. The shakeout era typically begins when the number of producers reaches a peak and ends when the number of producers again stabilizes at a lower level. 2 Table 7 of GK reports the number of years until shakeout for 39 industries. But only for 8 of them does Table 5 report data on the rate of price decline up to the shakeout. These are the eight reported in Figures 1 and 4 . 3 Deeper reasons for why firms find it hard to adopt new technology are modeled by Klepper and Thompson (2006) and Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2007) . right away. Rather, it induces an exit when all the capital that a firm owns reaches replacement age. Using our model and the GK data we then estimate that this loss hazard is between three and seventeen percent per year.
We also provide direct new evidence that firms with old capital are more likely to exit: In the air-transportation industry, exiting firms have capital that is on average eight years older than the capital of the surviving firms; in Section 6 we shall display this highly significant relation both for the U.S. and for the world as a whole. A related pattern emerges at the two-digit-industry level: Sectors that face more rapidly declining equipment-input prices experience higher rates of entry and exit (Samaniego, 2006) . In other words, a sector that enjoys a high rate of embodied technological change will have a high rate of entry and exit, or what one would normally understand to be a higher level of creative destruction.
All technological change in our model is embodied in capital, which means that TFP should be constant when one adjusts inputs for quality. During the shakeout, a fraction of the capital stock is replaced by new capital; the number of efficiency units of capital stays the same but the productivity of capital per physical unit rises.
The model is a standard vintage-capital model; Mitchell (2002) and Aizcorbe and Kortum (2005) use it to analyze industry equilibrium in steady state, i.e., the stationary case in which the effect of initial conditions has worn off, and after any possible investment spikes that may be caused by initial conditions have vanished. Jovanovic and Lach (1989) use it to analyze transitional dynamics but they generate neither a shakeout nor repeated investment echoes. We shall derive damped investment echoes that relate to the constant investment echoes derived by Boucekkine, Germain and Licandro (1997, henceforth BGL) in a similar GE model and by Mitra, Ray and Roy (1991) in a model where there is no progress but in which capital is replaced because it wears out. A number of other papers relate Figure 1 , among them, Caballero and Hammour (1994) , Klepper (1996) , and Utterback and Suarez (1993) . Some relate also to the repeated echoes that we shall document below. We shall discuss this work in Section 5.
Plan of the paper.-Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 and 4 describe tests of the two main propositions. Section 5 discusses other models. Section 6 links capital replacement to firm exit empirically. Section 7 presents the model's implications for TFP growth and Section 8 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains some proofs.
Model
Consider a small industry that takes as given the rate of interest, r, and the price of its capital. The product is homogeneous, and technology improves exogenously at the rate g. To use a technology of vintage t, however, a firm must buy capital of that vintage. The productivity of vintage-0 capital is normalized to 1, and so the productivity of vintage-t capital is e gt .
Each firm is of measure zero and takes prices as given. Let p be industry price, q industry output, and D (p, t) the demand curve at date t, assumed continuous in both arguments. Production of the good becomes feasible at t = 0.
The price of capital is unity for all t. Capital must be maintained at a cost of c per unit of time; c does not depend on the vintage of the capital, nor on time.
Capital cannot be resold to firms outside the industry; it has a salvage value of zero. We assume that willingness to pay at small levels of q is high enough to guarantee that investment will be positive immediately. 4 Implementation costs.-Relative to their contribution to industry output, new firms implement new technologies more than incumbents do; incumbents seem to face some additional costs of adopting new technology. Let τ denote the age of the firm and let ε (τ ) be that firm's cost of installing a unit of frontier capital. Since the cost of all capital is unity, the total cost of buying and installing capital of a τ -year old firm then is 1+ ε (τ ). We assume that ε (τ ) is a Poisson process, independent over firms. Its initial condition ε (0) = 0 with Poisson parameter λ and jump size κ > 0. This means that among firms aged τ , a fraction e −λτ will be on a par with entrants in their ability to adopt technology, and a fraction 1 − e −λτ will face costs of at least 1 + κ.
Industry output.-Capital is the only input. Let K t (s) be the date-t stock of active capital of vintage s or older, not adjusted for quality. Industry output at time t is the sum of the outputs of all the active capital
Capital ceases to be active when it is scrapped. Evolution of the capital stock.-Because capital is supplied to the industry at a constant price, the investment rate will exhibit damped echoes. Any mass point that occurs will repeat itself, though in a damped form. That is, if a mass-point of investment ever forms, will recur at a periodicity of T , and the size of the mass point will diminish over time. Moreover, there must be an initial mass point at t = 0 because no capital is in place when the industry comes into being. After that initial mass point, capital evolves smoothly until date T when the original capital is completely replaced by vintage-T capital. This is the second industry investment spike. The third investment spike then occurs at date 2T , when all the vintage-T capital is replaced, and so on. Since the inter-spike waiting times are T , and since the first spike occurs at t = 0, the date of the i'th investment spike is (i − 1) T , for i = 1, 2, .... Let i (t) be the integer index of the most recent spike. 5 We plot i (t) in Figure 2 . 4 Sufficient for this is that Figure 2 : The number of spikes, i (t).
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We shall show that equilibrium is indeed of the form described in the previous paragraph: All the capital created at one spike date is replaced at the following spike date, T periods later. Therefore the capital stock at date t comprises capital created at the most recent spike date i (t), plus the flow of investment, x (t) , over the preceding T periods.
Let X i denote the size of the i'th investment spike. At date t, then, the amount of capital accounted for by the last spike is X i(t) , and the date-t cumulative distribution of capital by vintage is
We portray K t (s) in Figure 3 . It has exactly one discontinuity at (i (t) − 1) T .
Equilibrium
The definition of equilibrium is simple if x (t) > 0 for all t. BGL call this the 'no holes' assumption because when it holds, the vintage distribution of capital in use has no gaps in it. The Appendix provides conditions -in (20) -that guarantee the 'no holes' outcome. DEFINITION: A constant-T equilibrium consists of a product-price function p (t) , a retirement-age of capital, T, investment flows x (t) > 0, and investment spikes X i accruing at dates (i − 1) T, (i = 1, 2, ...) that satisfy, for each t ≥ 0, the following three conditions:
1. Optimal retirement of capital : The revenue of a vintage-t machine at date t 0 ∈ [t, t + T ] is e gt p (t 0 ). Since price declines monotonically, it is optimal to replace vintage-t capital as soon as its revenue equals its maintenance cost:
The date-t distribution of capital by vintage, s.
Optimal investment:
Only entrants and incumbents for whom ε (τ ) = 0 will invest, because for them the total cost of a new machine is unity. If investment x (t) > 0, the present value of a new capital good must equal its cost. The present value of the net revenues derived from that (vintage-t) unit of capital must satisfy
If the RHS of (4) were ever less than unity, x (t) would be zero. 6 3. Market clearing:
Since the industry does not exist before date zero, x (t) = 0 for t < 0, so that D (p (0) , 0) = X 1 .
Proposition 1 If demand satisfies (20)
7 , a constant-T equilibrium exists, with
6 Proposition 4 of BGL covers that case which arises when there is too high an initial stock of capital. This cannot be true at t = 0 in our model, and we shall state conditions in (20) that exclude it as an equilibrium possibility at any date. 7 For example, the demand function D (p, t) = p ε for ε > 1 satisfies (20) . A necessary and sufficient condition for x (t) > 0 for t ≥ 0 is that output increase with t which, in turn, requires either that the demand shift to the right fast enough or that it be sufficiently elastic.
and where T uniquely solves µ r + c c ¶ (r + g) = ge −rT + re gT .
Proof. (i) First we show that (6), (7), and (8) imply (3) and (4): Eq. (6) and (7) imply (3) for all t ≥ 0, i.e., exit occurs at all t ≥ T . When substituted into (4), (6) and (7) 
Multiplying by r (r + g) /c we have r (r + g)+c (r + g)
−rT ¢ , and cancelling cre −rT and combining terms we reach (8) . Therefore if T solves (8), (4) holds.
(ii) Exactly one solution T to (8): The LHS of (8) is constant and exceeds r + g. On the other hand, the RHS of (8) is continuous and strictly increases from r + g to infinity, having the derivative rg ¡ e gT − e −rT ¢ > 0 for T > 0. Therefore the two curves have exactly one strictly positive intersection.
(iii) (5) holds: We invoke (20) and invoke the proof in the Appendix. The time path of prices depends on the productivity of the latest vintage of capital. Because the supply curve for new, more productive capital is infinitely elastic, p (t) depends on the cost side alone.
The nature and frequency of the spikes
Relation to Figure 1. -The negative pattern arises across steady states indexed by g; a situation in which each industry experiences its specific rate of technological progress g. Implicitly differentiating (8) in the Appendix, we reach the result: Proposition 2 The replacement cycle is shorter if technological progress is faster:
Thus, industries with higher productivity growth should have an earlier shakeout and more frequent subsequent spikes. 8 The second relation concerns the rate at which investment echoes or investment spikes die off: Proposition 3 Investment spikes decay geometrically. That is,
for n = 1, 2, ....
Proof.
Because p (t) is continuous at T , the number of efficiency units replaced at the spikes is a constant, X 1 , which means that X n = e −gT X n−1 , and (11) follows.
The spike dates remain T periods apart, at 0, T, 2T, 3T, .... The spikes occur regularly because technological progress occurs at the steady rate g. Asymptotically, however, the spikes vanish and the equilibrium becomes like the one that Mitchell (2002) and Aizcorbe and Kortum (2005) analyze.
Firm exit at the investment spike.-At a replacement spike at date t, say, all firms that need to replace their capital bought that capital at date t − T . All firms, whatever their age was at date t − T had ε = 0 at that time Among those, a fraction 1 − e −λT will have experienced a jump in ε and will not find it profitable to invest. These firms will then exit.
The remaining parameters of the model are the maintenance cost c and the rate of interest r. The following claim is proved in the Appendix:
A rise in the maintenance cost, c, reduces the lifetime of capital as one would expect. Since replacing capital constitutes an investment, when the rate of interest rises that form of investment is discouraged, and it will occur less frequently.
T vs. g: Testing Proposition 2
We shall begin by proxying the age, T , of an industry at its first replacement spike, by the industry's age at which the shakeout of its firms begins. This measure will underlie the first test of the model. And as suggested by (6), we shall proxy the rate of technological progress, g, by the rate at which the price of the product declines. Since replacement episodes are in the model caused by technological progress, we first check if industries with higher productivity growth experience earlier shakeouts. That is, we ask whether industries with a high g have a low T as Proposition 2 claims and, if so, how well the solution for T to (8) fits the cross-industry data on g and T .
Product nameĝ We now describe the procedure by which we choose the model's parameters. By Proposition 1, a unique solution to (8) for T exists; denote it byT (r, c, g). In Table 1 , T (1) is the date that GK find that Stage 4 (the shakeout stage) begins in their various industries. In a couple of cases the shakeout had not yet begun, and they are censored. The annual rate at which the price declines, averaged over the period h 0,T (1) i isĝ (1) i . We do not have observations on r and c; we find r = .07 a reasonable guess, but wish to check robustness with respect to this assumption and therefore choose three alternative values for r, namely .02, .07 and .12 and in each case estimate c. The estimation routine minimizes the sum of squared deviations of the model from the data for the eight industries for which we have complete information on both g and T :
.
The data and the three implicit functionsT (g, r, c) fitted to them are shown in Figure  4 . The estimates of c and their standard errors are reported in the figure. The R T (r , c , g ) Figure 4 : The relation betweenT andĝ for the eight uncensored GK observations; censored observations not used here.
was roughly .53 in each case. Since r makes little difference to the predicted relation we shall proceed with the value r = .07 for the remainder of the analysis. Our estimate of c is in the range of typical maintenance spending. McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) report that in Canada, total maintenance and repair expenditures have averaged 5.7 percent of GDP over the period from 1981 to 1993, and 6.1 percent if one goes back to 1961. These estimates are relative to output, however, whereas ours are relative to the purchase price of the machine which is normalized to unity. Relative to output, maintenance costs are one hundred percent at the point when the machine is retired (this is equation [3] ). Maintenance costs are constant over the machine's lifetime, whereas the value of the machine's output relative to the numeraire good is e gT when the machine is new. Now e gT averages around e 1.7 = 5.5 -see Figures 14 and 15 -so that as a percentage of output, maintenance spending ranges between 18 and 100 percent. Therefore, c must stand partly for wages to workers as a fixed-proportion input as in the original vintage-capital models like Arrow (1962) and Johansen (1959) that had a fixed labor requirement.
Testing Proposition 2 using an alternative definition of T
We now entertain a different definition of T ; one that may provide a better test of the model, and one that will provide us with more observations. The main reason for doing this is that GK's 'Stage 1,' defined as the period during which the number of producers is still small (usually two or three), may not contain what we would call an investment spike. During stage 1, only a few firms enter, a number that is in some industries -autos and tires, e.g., -much smaller than the number of firms that exit during the shakeout.
The model predicts a date-zero investment spike X 1 = D (p 0 , 0), without which there would be no exit spike at date T . Not all the GK industries will fit this, however. Indeed, GK state that rarely is a product's initial commercial introduction immediately followed by rapid entry. Autos, e.g., had very low sales early on, and it took years for sales to develop. 10 Therefore the spike is better defined at or around the time when the entry of firms was at its highest. Moreover, in GK, for many industries, the shakeouts were not completed until a few years after they first began. It may thus be more appropriate to designate the shakeout date as the midpoint of the shakeout episode instead of as the start date of the shakeout episode.
In light of this, letT (2) be the time elapsed between the industry's 'Takeoff' date (which is when Stage 2 begins) and the midpoint of the the industry's shakeout episode (the midpoint of Stage 4). This revised definition for b T calls for adjusting b g to be the rate of the average annual price decline between the takeoff date (which comes after the industry has completed stage 1), and the first shakeout date. We call this variableĝ (2) . This allows us to enlarge the sample. The additions are as follows:
1. For six of the GK industries, complete information for price-declines in Stages 2 and 3 (but not Stage 1) is available. They can now be added to the analysis;
2. The two censored observations listed in Table 2 will also be added;
3. We replace the GK information for the TV by that reported in Wang (2006), who compiled the data from the Television Factbook. This change may better reflect the history of the TV industry as GK dated the birth of the industry as early as 1929, while according to Wang, the commercial introduction of TV starts only in 1947.
The estimation procedure.-The inclusion of the two censored observations leads us to use maximum likelihood. We set r = 0.07 and assume that the distribution of c over industries is log-normal: For all firms in industry i, ln c i is a draw from N (ln c, σ
2 ). We then estimate c and σ to fit the model to the data; the details are in the Appendix.
The estimate ofc = 0.078 is a bit higher than with the previous sample. This is because T is smaller under the new definition, and a higher replacement cost is needed to generate the earlier replacement. Figure 5 plots the predicted T for the industry for which c = c. For the two truncated observations, Ball-point pens and Nylon, the data points represent the respective means conditional on their truncated values. 
Echoes: Testing Proposition 3
Let us first elaborate on the content of Proposition 3
1. Shakeouts should diminish geometrically in absolute terms. Relative to the size of the industry, however, the decline will be faster than (11) indicates because industry output increases from its date-zero level -both because price declines and because the demand curve tends to shift to the right over time.
2. Moreover, exit spikes should coincide with entry spikes.
3. The inter-spike waiting times should depend negatively on g as Proposition 2 claims.
This section tests these implications using Agarwal's extension and update of the GK data, described fully in Agarwal (1998). 11 The products are listed and some statistics on them presented in Table 3 in the Appendix.
A procedure for detecting spikes must recognize the following features of the data: (A) Length of histories differ by product.-Coverage differs widely over products, from 18 years (Video Cassette Recorders) to 84 years (Phonograph Records).
(B) The volatility of entry and exit declines as products age.-The model predicts that the volatility of entry and exit should decline with industry age. Other factors also imply such a decline: (i) Convex investment costs at the industry level, as in Caballero and Hammour (1994) , and (ii) Firm-specific c's. Both (i) and (ii) would transform our X n from spikes into waves and, eventually, ripples. 12 Hodrick-Prescott residuals in entry and exit rates.-Our spike-detection procedure is in the spirit of the investment-spike literature that defines a spike as an unusually high investment rate. 13 Roughly speaking, we shall say that a spike in a series Y t occurs whenever its HP residual is more than two standard deviations above its mean. 'Roughly', because of adjustments for (A) and (B) above. We constrain industry i's trend, τ , by
where A i is the age at which an industry's coverage ends. We set a = 0.005 for both series. Because both series are heteroskedastic, with higher variances in earlier years, we chose b = 0.7 for both entry and exit (If b were unity, an industry with longer coverage would have a larger fraction of its observations explained by the trend). The trend therefore explains about the same fraction of the variation in short-coverage industries as in long-coverage industries.
This fixes problem (A), but not (B): The HP residual, u t ≡ Y t − τ t , is still heteroskedastic, the variance being higher at lower ages. To fix this, we assume that the standard-deviation depends on product age as follows:
where σ 0 ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are product-specific parameters estimated by maximizing the normal likelihood
12 Spikes may also dissipate because (i) A positive shock to demand would start a new spike and series of echoes following it; these would mix with the echoes stemming from the initial investment spike, (ii) Random machine breakdowns at the rate δ would transform (11) into X n = e −(g+δ)T (n−1) X 1 , which decays faster with n. 13 Gourio and Kashyap (2007) record a spike whenever investment exceeds twenty percent of the beginning-of-period capital stock, which is roughly 2.5 times the level of replacement investment. This leads to 15-20 percent of the years being spike years. Our procedure produces a weighted average of 4.3 percent of the years as exit-spike years and 5.6 percent as entry-spike years.
14 Although the HP residuals are not independent and unlikely to be normal, this procedure still appears to have removed the heteroskedasticity in the sense that the spikes were as likely to occur late in an industry's life as they were to occur early on.
The spike-detection algorithm.-If at some date the HP residual is more than two standard deviations above its mean of zero, then that date is a spike date. But we shall allow for the possibility that unusually high replacement will take up to three periods. Thus we shall say that a series Y t in a certain time window is above 'normal' if one or more of the following events occurs 1-period spike:
u t > 2σ t , 2-period spike:
u t > σ t and u t+1 > σ t+1 , 3-period spike:
The cutoff levels of 2, 1, and
times σ t were chosen in the expectation that each of the three events would carry the same (small) probability of being true under the null. The latter depends on the distribution and the serial correlation of the u t which we do not know. But, again for the normal case, these probabilities turned out to be roughly the same. That is,
.025, and Table 3 summarizes the results in more detail. The 33 products are listed alphabetically and are so numbered. To explain the table, let us focus on product 23, Phonograph Records and read across the row. Records were first commercialized, i.e., sold, in 1908. Being the oldest product, it also is the product for which we have the most observations, 84, since (with one exception) the series all end in 1991. The next four entries are the exit and entry spikes, by age of industry and by calendar year. There are seven one-year spikes and one two-year spike, this being the last exit spike. The 1934 exit spike is labelled in red because it falls in the GK shakeout region the dates of which are in the last column of the table. See Figure 6 where the GK shakeout region is shaded. The remaining columns report the correlations between the entry and exit series. 15 The raw series are negatively correlated -when the industry is young, entry is higher than exit, and later the reverse is true -but the correlation is slight (-0.07). The trends (i.e., the τ 's) are more negatively correlated (-0.27). The HP residuals, on the other hand, are positively correlated; our model suggests that this should be so because the spikes should coincide. The correlations averaged across products are at the bottom of the table. 6 1909 1914 1919 1924 1929 1934 1939 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 GK Stage 4 Table 3 shows this is true in most industries. This suggests that the heteroskedasticity adjustment in (12) is adequate.
2. The number of entry and exit spikes is equal -four entry and four exit spikes. But only the final, fourth spikes coincide in that they are within one year of each other. There were ten other products for which this was so. In seven out of the ten, there is at least one instance where an entry an exit spikes occur in the same year.
3. The second exit spike is well in the GK region, but there should also have been an entry spike in that region. Over all the industries the number of entry spikes (67 in all) is slightly less than the number of entry spikes (79 in all), for the nine industries in which the GK region does contain an Agarwal spike, it is always an exit spike -see the red numbers in Table 3. 4. Just as our model predicts, however, T 2,i − T 1,i is negatively related toĝ i . That is, analogously to the result in Figures 4 , the first exit spike is followed sooner by the second exit spike in those industries i where prices decline faster. We now calculate b g as the rate of average price decline during the years covered by T 2 − T 1 . To maximize the number of observations, we include products for which price information is available for as little as 70% of the time during the years covered by T 2 − T 1 . For Outboard Motors and Recording Tapes, however, price went up during those years which is inconsistent with the model. But they both had above-average T 2 − T 1 values, 42 and 17 respectively, and while we did not include them in the estimation routine, we include them in Figure  7 , settingĝ to zero in both cases.
5. The same test is also done on entry spikes. Once again, T 2,i − T 1,i is negatively related toĝ i . The results are in Figure 8 . 16 At first it may seem like a better fit could be obtained at a lower value ofc which would raise the red curve upwards. The problem, however, is that a fall in c raises T by much more when g is low, as one can verify from (7), so that the curve moves clockwise.
Test of entry-exit coincidence
Entry and exit spikes should occur simultaneously, but this is true in the minority of cases. We wish to test the degree of significance of the bunching. To do it, we shall test the null hypothesis that they are not bunched. If the entry and exit spikes were unrelated, there still would be a positive probability that they would coincide. We wish to show that the number of coincidences significantly exceeds the fraction that would be expected to arise if the two sets of dates were uncorrelated.
Under the null that the two sets of dates are uncorrelated, we now derive the probability that there will be no coincidences in dates. This will be a limited-information test because we are unable to derive the probability distribution of the full sample. We shall find that the number of industries in which coincidence occurs is significantly 16 For both plotsc solves min c
, whereT denotes an inter-spike waiting time.
larger than implied by this null. Suppose an industry has τ periods of coverage and that during these τ periods there were N E entry spikes and N X exit spikes. Suppose entry spikes happened at dates t 1 , t 2 , ..., t i entry (τ ) . Suppose that the dates of the entry spikes were not correlated with the dates of the exit spikes. Suppose, moreover, that an exit spike was equally likely to fall at any date. No match will arise if and only if none of the N X exit spikes matches any of the N E entry spikes. In other words, under the null hypothesis, H 0 , the spikes are exchangeable random variables which are correlated only in so far as they cannot fall at the same date as another spike. Exit-spike i is equally likely to fall in each 'free' year that the GK data cover. We condition on the entry-spike dates. Only their number matters, not their actual dates: Any set of dates would produce the same likelihood (13) .
To derive the probabilities, begin by placing the exit spikes in random order i = 1, ..., N X . Then under H 0 : "entry and exit dates are uncorrelated", the probability that the first exit spike falls in one of the τ − N E bins not occupied by an entry spike is
. Since no two exit spikes can occupy the same bin, conditional on this event, the probability second randomly chosen spike date will produce no match is
. Proceeding in this way sequentially until the N X 'th exit spike, the probability under H 0 that there is no match is
Denote the solution for ρ by ρ = ψ (τ, N X , N E ). The formula conditions on τ , N X and N E all three of which generally differ over industries. For industry j write
Then ρ j is the probability that industry j has at least one match. Now define the dichotomous random variable m j as follows: Let m j = ½ 1 if industry j has at least one exit-entry match 0 otherwise so that m j = 1 with probability ρ j and m j = 0 with probability 1 − ρ j . That is, m j is binomially distributed. The Likelihood function. -Let ρ j be the parameter for industry j, defined in (14) . Among the 31 industries for which ρ j can be defined, let J be the set of industries for which m j = 1. The likelihood of the sample is
The p-value.-The p-value is the probability of obtaining a result at least as extreme as the one that was actually observed (in our case 7 industries for which , given H 0 . Let the collection of industries be I; that is, I = {1, 2, ..., 31} is a set consisting of 31 elements. Let M = P j∈I m j . In our context,
and H 0 o .
Of course, H 0 determines the ρ j via (13) . Let J M be the collection of M-element subsets of I. That is, J M = {J ⊂ I | #J = M}. Then,
This is the likelihood of all possible values of M that equal n or more. The probability distribution of M under H 0 is p n+1 −p n and it is shown in Figure 9 . Since p 7 = 0.0217, we reject H 0 at the 5% but not at the 1% level.
Other explanations
Our model and Propositions 1 and 2 are supply-side arguments. In relating to past work it is convenient to divide it into demand side and supply side types of explanations.
Demand-side explanations
These we divide into aggregate and industry-level.
Aggregate demand
Gourio and Kashyap (2007) find investment spikes to be procyclical (Gourio and Kashyap), and other work finds exits to be countercyclical. The concern this raises is that what we have termed as 'echoes' are instead reflections of the business cycle. Be they aggregate or industry demand shocks, however, it would seem that they should produce an asychronicity between entry and exit: Entry should occur when demand is high and exits should happen when demand is low. Our clustering test shows, however, that entry and exit spikes tend go together. Now we ask if entry spikes are less likely and exit spikes more likely to occur during NBER recession years. 17 This logic would seem to have been at work in the Phonograph industry in that, as Figure 6 shows, that in the two of the four exit spikes -the 1913 and the 1974 spikesoccurred during recession years and none of the entry spike dates did. However, this asymmetry does not show up in other industries. When we consider all the industries there is no correlation between recession years and spike dates. Our tests are simple comparisons of means. Let τ j be the number of years of coverage of industry j, and τ R j the number of recession years contained in τ j . Similarly, let φ j be the number of spikes in industry j and φ R j the number of those spikes that fall in a recession year. 18 Then we ask if either of the following inequalities is significant:
The demand hypothesis implies that for exits the LHS should exceed the RHS and that for entry the LHS should be less than the RHS. It turns out that the LHS is smaller for both exit and entry, but neither difference is significant. We interpret this as a test of differences in the means based on P j τ j independent samplings. See Appendix Table 4 . 17 The NBER dates are in quarters but our spike dates are in years. A given year was deemed a recession year if any of the following criteria was met: (1) if a NBER recession was underway for the whole year, (2) if a NBER recession started in the first 2 quarters of the year, (3) if a NBER recession ended in the last 2 quarters of the year. There are two exceptions, Both the 1918 and 1990 recessions started in the 3rd quater and ended in the 1st quater of the following year. 18 Because of time aggregation, demand fluctuations can induce a spike in that x(t) reacts positively to changes in demand.
Industry demand
Caballero and Hammour (1994) find that if replacement of capital causes interruptions in production, it is optimal to replace capital when demand temporarily drops, for then the foregone sales are at their lowest. Klenow (1998) finds that when, in addition, the productivity of new capital rises with cumulative output, a firm will replace capital when the recovery is about to start. This raises the productivity growth of the new capital.
If an exit spike is caused by a fall in industry demand, we should observe a fall in output around the time of the spike. Moreover, a demand decline produces a shakeout and a decline in p. If demand does not decline then there is no shakeout and no decline in p. We divide the GK industries into those in which output fell during the shakeout period, and into those in which output rose. For the analysis in Figure  4 , among the industries where output fell during the shakeout, 19 . 22 Yet the demand hypothesis implies the opposite: Prompted by the decline in output,ĝ (the measured decline in p) should have been higher andT should have been lower in the first sample than in the second. Thus demand shifts do not seem to explain the patterns in GK's sample.
Supply-side explanations
Echo effects were first discussed in the growth literature. In a one-consumption-good GE model, for the interest rate to remain constant in the face of variations in the rate of investment that inevitably occur along the transition path from arbitrary initial conditions, the instantaneous utility of consumption must be linear. Then, if the rate of technological progress is also constant, the investment echoes will have the constant periodicity that they also have in our model, but they will not be damped. Rather, the investment profile simply repeats itself every T periods -see Mitra et al. (1991) and BGL. Johansen (1959) and Arrow (1962) assume a production function for the sole final good that is Leontieff in capital and labor. In that case the effective maintenance cost is the wage multiplied by the labor requirement per machine. Since wages rise at the same rate as the rate at which the labor requirement declines, and the maintenance rate is then constant in units of the consumption good. Thus our maintenance cost, c, has an exact counterpart in these models. Since these models have no costs of rapid adjustment, the infinitely-elastic supply of capital that we assume amounts to the same thing. Endogenous technological change.-Our model assumes that technological change is exogenous. Klepper (1996) assumes firms do research, and his model appears to imply that leading firms would squeeze out the inefficient fringe more quickly in industries where there is more technological opportunity and, hence, faster-declining product prices. The difference between our model and his concerns the fate of the firms in the first cohort of entrants: In our model the first cohort is the least efficient, whereas in Klepper's model, the first cohort is the most efficient because it has done the most research. In Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) , monopoly incumbents are periodically replaced by more efficient entrants. Tse (2001) extends the model to allow for more than a single producer.
Exit after learning through experience.-Gort and Klepper (1982, henceforth GK) observed that a shakeout usually comes after a wave of entry. Horvath, Schivardi and Woywode (2003) argue that if a run-up in entry occurs at some point in the industry's life, then some time later, a fraction of the entrants will have found themselves unfit to be in that industry -a type of learning that Jovanovic (1982) stresses -and will then exit en masse. The argument of Horvath et al. (2003) would measure the learning period by T . After exactly T periods, a firm discovers whether it has high costs and should exit. To develop this argument fully one would have to somehow to show first that a firm's learning about productivity is likely to take place all at once and not gradually as one usually assumes. And, second, one would need to explain why learning should occur sooner in those industries where p is declining rapidly.
Technological advances by incumbents.-When a new technology raises the efficient scale of firms, it crowds some of them out of the industry; so argue Hopenhayn (1993) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) . The assembly-line technology, e.g., probably raised the optimal scale of auto-manufacturing plants and caused a large reduction in the number of auto producers. Klepper (1996) argues that larger firms do more R&D than small firms because they can spread its results over a larger number of units; because they invent at a faster rate, large firms then drive smaller firms out, often by acquiring them.
Consolidations for other reasons.-Some shakeouts no doubt occur because of the standardization of products so that some of the variants fall by the wayside and their producers exit. The focus on the diesel technology was one reason for the mass exodus of automobile producers that relied on other technologies as a source of power for the models they built. The winning model forces out other models and their producers. Utterback and Suarez (1993) argue that a dominant design emerges: More generally, consolidations and merger waves can occur for reasons unrelated to drops in demand and to advances in technology. Deregulation, for instance, has led to merger waves in the airlines and banking industries (Andrade et al. 2001) and to a sharp fall in the numbers of producers.
Evidence shows there are investment spikes -Cooper and Haltiwanger (1996), Gourio and Kashyap (2007) . Repeated echo effects in entry and exit seem to be present in the data and they are clear indications that a vintage-capital replacement motive is one of their causes. It remains for us to link the exit decision to the age of a firm's capital stock and we shall do that in Section 6.
Capital replacement and exit
Our model assumes that ε (τ ) jumps at the rate λ, but really only the first jump matters, since that first jump suffices to disqualify a firm from competing in the market for new capital. The general question can be put as follows: 'Do incumbent firms develop a disadvantage in setting up machines and plants of the newest vintages and, if so, how quickly?' The literature offers some indirect evidence. Prusa and Schmitz (1994) find that a firm's initial product is better than its second product, its second better than its third, and so on. Christensen (1997) cites examples of diskdrive producers and printer producers that failed to invest in the new technologies that entrants brought in. Henderson (1993) Tables 1-5 show that in the early days of a product (here a diameter of a disk), new entrants lead the pack in terms of quality (here defined as storage capacity). As the format matures, the incumbents become leaders. There are 5 new generations of drives in the data set; all of them were pioneered by spin-outs. 23 To this evidence we shall add some direct evidence that airline companies are more likely to exit when their capital is old. But in the next subsection we shall first estimate λ using the GK data.
Estimating λ
Let φ ≡ X 1 q T be the fraction of capacity replaced at the first shakeout. As a first approximation we assume that all firms are of the same size. Since ε is independent over firms, the fraction of firms that exit is y
be the initial output of the industry relative to its output at the shakeout date. From Since all of the initial capacity is replaced at T , it must mean that X 1 = q 0 and that therefore Proposition 5 The fraction of firms that exit at T is
The restriction in (16) holds regardless of why output has grown. Output may have grown because the demand curve shifted out, or it may have grown because demand is elastic so that the price decline led output to grow. The end result in (16) is the same.
We have two sets of estimates of λ. For the first, we calculate b z i from GK's table 5 as the inverse of the rate of output increase from the date industry i was born up to the date when the number of firms in the industry peaked. We calculateŷ i = GK's Table 4 column 3. This is the total decrease in the number of firms for a period of time that lasted, on average, for 5.4 years after the date at which the number of firms in the industry peaked. We calculateT i from GK's table 7 as the number of years between the birth of the industry to the beginning of the shakeout; the numbers reported in theT (1) column in Table 1 . Firms may also exit for reasons that are outside the model. 24 To represent these other exits we add a constant, β 0 , to the RHS of the regression equation. Thus, we suppose thatŷ
i + u i , where the u i are sector-specific disturbances. We use non-linear least squares; i.e., Estimates of λ with the alternative definition of y, z, and T .-The second estimate of λ comes from a larger sample that we can get if we use the alternative definitions of y, z, and T that takes the date of the first spike to be the takeoff date of an industry, i.e., the start of GK's Stage 2. The values for the revised b
T are the numbers shown in theT (2) column in Table 1 . In that case, if we ignore as negligible the capacity created before the takeoff date, b z should equal the inverse of the rate of output increase during GK's stages two and three only. There are 5 industries in GK for which output data, as well as information on b y, are available from the takeoff date to the shakeout date but not earlier. These industries can now be added to the analysis. As we explain in Section 3, for the TV industry, we find it better to use the information from Wang (2006) in place of GK. The results and the fit for the larger data set (no of observations = 9) are described in Figure 11 .
Evidence on aircraft retirement and airline exit
We now report our findings using data on aircraft where accurate information on age is available. Among exiting firms, the age of the capital stock is always T . Surviving capital is generally younger than that. If demand was almost perfectly inelastic, there would be very little investment between the spike dates, and the capital stock among surviving firms would be almost as old as that among exiting firms. On the other hand, if demand is highly elastic, most of the existing capital would be quite young. Thus if we let a S be the average age of the surviving firms' capital stock, unless we specify the demand curve all we can say is that Figure 12 shows the empirical counterparts of a S (blue dots) and T (red dots) for the airline industry. In the U.S., the airplanes of exiting airlines were on average 7 years older than those of the surviving airlines. After weighing by the number of observations, the difference is highly significant. Balloon size is for each series proportional to the square root of the number of observations, but the constant of proportionality is larger for the exiting capital series so as to allow us to see how sample size of that series too evolves over time. Figure 13 shows almost as strong a difference among all the world airlines. Capital of exiting airlines was four years older than the capital of surviving airlines and the difference in the means is again highly significant. Surprisingly, perhaps, the U.S. carriers operated older planes than the carriers based in other countries. A description of the data is in the Appendix, but a summary is in Table 2 : As reported in the table, a plane is counted as one observation for each year of its life. An airline is counted at most twice -as a survivor and then possibly as an exiter. 25 Three other pieces of evidence link exit decisions to the need to replace capital to the decision to exit 1. Plant exit.- Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) find that old plants are (i) less likely to exit, but (ii) more likely to exit when their equipment is old. Fact (i) they attribute to the idea that plants gradually learn their productivity and exit if the news is unfavorable as Jovanovic (1982) argued. Fact (ii) they attribute to the vintage-capital effect on exit.
2. The trading of patent rights.-The renewal of a patent is similar to replacing a piece of capital in the sense that a renewal cost must be paid if the owner of the patent is to continue deriving value from it. If that owner sells the patent right, he effectively exits the activity that the patent relates to. Serrano (2006) finds that the probability of a patent being traded rises at its renewal dates, indicating that the decision to exit is related to the wearing out of a patent right.
3. Higher embodied technical progress raises exit.-A faster rate of decline in the price of capital makes it optimal to replace capital more frequently. If replacement sometimes leads to exit, we should see more exit where there is more embodied progress. Samaniego (2006) indeed finds that in sectors where the prices of machinery inputs fall faster, the firms using those machines experience higher rates of exit.
Firm exit
A firm 'exits' in the GK data when it stops producing a product. In the theory presented so far, firms can exit only at ages T, 2T, and so on. Pooling over products, Agarwal and Gort (1996, Figure 2 ) show that hazard rates for firm exit tend to rise once age exceeds 30 or 40 years, and perhaps this is because their capital is old and needs replacing. It is conceivable that mixtures over industries could produce downward-sloping hazards. The fact is, however, that firms in every industry can and do fail at young ages and for reasons often unrelated to the age of their capital. Thus as a theory of exit within a particular industry, the model as it stands is quite inadequate. The object here is not to seek a general theory of firm exit but, rather, only to show that our theory of the shakeout is robust to the introduction of other reasons for exit. We shall now show that the model can produce exit spikes every T periods, and still have a realistic exit hazard. To do it, we shall assume that firms experience cost shocks and that there is a frictionless used-capital market within the industry. This market becomes active if firms have different c's. We continue to assume that capital has zero value to anyone outside the industry. Suppose, then, that c rises permanently when the firm or plant is τ years old, and suppose further that the hazard, h (τ ), of such an event is decreasing in τ , perhaps because of a positive effect that learning by doing exerts on the firm's production efficiency.
A firm that experiences a rise in c will immediately sell its capital to firms in the industry that have not experienced such a rise, and extract the full value of the profits that the machine will yield until its replacement date. The investment condition (4) is then unchanged because the resale value of the capital fully captures what the firm would have obtained for itself had its c remained at its original level. The new owner of the capital would choose to retire it at the same date that the original owner would have had he not experienced a rise in c and therefore the exit condition (3) also remains unchanged, as does (5) . Equilibrium is therefore exactly the same. However, now there will be two kinds of exit: (i) When the firm's capital is up for replacement and that the firm's implementation cost has gone up since the last time capital was installed, and this hazard is zero except for spikes every T periods, (ii) When the firm's c has risen, which has the hazard h (τ ). For τ < T, the exit hazard is just h and it is decreasing in τ . At τ = T , (i) dominates (ii) since time is continuous. But over a discrete time period, (ii) could dominate (i), in which case the exit hazard would decrease monotonically. 26 The general point is that the GK observations that Figure 1 portrays concern industry aggregates. Our model too is mainly about these aggregates and it is probably consistent with a wide variety of assumptions about turbulence at the more micro level.
Implications for productivity growth
The model has no labor, and so TFP is simply the productivity of capital. 27 If the price of capital used to deflate investment spending were per unit of quality, then all the technological progress would appear in the capital stock, the resulting measure of the capital stock would be given by (1) and would equal output, with TFP being constant at unity. On the other hand, if no adjustment is made for quality so that the price index used to deflate investment was unity, then the capital stock would be given by K (t, t) as given by (2) when evaluated at s = t, and TFP would equal
Thus TFP rises smoothly until the shakeout date, and then it experiences an upward jump during the shakeout when the number of physical units of capital falls, but the number of their efficiency units stays unchanged. of textile industries he found that the relation was positive and significant. 28 Dwyer measured dispersion by the TFP ratio of the tenth percentile plants to the ninetieth percentile plants. TFP growth ranged from about two percent to about eight percent and the TFP ratio ranged between 2.4 to 4.6.
TFP growth vs. dispersion
Our model cannot generate such large dispersion, even when we measure dispersion as the ratio of the most productive to the least productive producer. Figure 14 plots the logarithm of ln TFP max TFP min = gT as a function of g. It shows, in other words, the comparative steady-state relation between inequality and growth. 29 The relation is positive, but for the less-than-tenpercent range of TFP growth (which would include all of Dwyer's industries), the most we can explain is a ratio of about 1.75. Table 5 of Aizcorbe and Kortum (2005) reports a result similar to the one portrayed in Figure 14 -when g is larger, gT should go up. Figure 14 is based on the information in Figure 4 , and on the least-squares estimate c = 0.039. If we switch to measuring T by the time between the industry's takeoff and the midpoint of the shakeout episode while adjusting the measure of g accordingly, and if we use the ML estimate ofc reported in Figure 5 , we get the results shown in 28 At the two-digit level, Oikawa (2006) finds a positive relation between TFP growth and TFP dispersion measured by the standard deviation of the logs. 29 Moreover, the model's implications for inequality have a curious discontinuity at g = 0. Namely, if g is really zero, then everyone should be using the same quality machine and there should be no TFP inequality. But a steady state with a very small g would have TFP inequality of at least unity. The difference is merely that the variable plotted on the vertical axis is gT instead of T . Since the data do not have T declining with g as fast as the model predicts, the relation between g and gT is steeper than the model predicts. This is especially evident in Figure 15 .
A further difficulty with the model as an explanation of TFP dispersion is that the dynamics of TFP do not quite match the dynamics of actual plants in the data. In a word, too much leapfrogging goes on. In the data TFP-rank reverses sometimes, but we hardly ever see the 'last shall be first' phenomenon of the least productive producer suddenly becoming the most productive. In our model, a plant would move smoothly down the distribution of percentiles until it reached the last percentile, and it then would suddenly jump back up to the first percentile, and so on. Analysis of productivity transitions by Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992, Table 3 ) does not bear this out. Plants move up and down the various quintiles of the distribution and the transition matrix is fairly full. Moreover, births tend to be of below average productivity.
On the positive side, a supporting fact in Baily et al.'s transition matrix is that more plants (14 percent) move from the bottom quintile to the top quintile than the reverse (5 percent). One reason why we do not see the dramatic 'last shall be first' rank reversals is the tendency for a plant's TFP to grow as it ages. 30 Thus a new, cutting-edge plant does not immediately have the highest productivity. Rather, its productivity grows as it ages, as Bahk and Gort (1993) , and Transitional dynamics in productivity dispersion.-The model implies that in the initial stages of an industry's life, the distribution of TFP across producers should be fanning out. How fast it does so, however, should depend on the rate of technological progress, i.e., on g. This is the rate at which the productivity of new capital gains at the expense of old capital. But after the industry reaches age T , no further fanning out takes place, because old capital begins to be withdrawn. Thereafter, dispersion remains constant at its steady-state level. In Figure 16 we show how the fanning out process depends on the industry's growth rate by plotting, for four different values of g, the logarithm of
where t is the age of the industry. In contrast, learning models like that of Jovanovic (1982) are ambiguous on this score: The dispersion among survivors can become more narrow over time if certain distributional assumptions are met, as was the case for the distribution that Jovanovic (1982) used -the variance of the truncated normal distribution is smaller than the variance of the untruncated distribution.
Conclusion
This paper started out with a graphical display of evidence that industry shakeouts of firms occur earlier in industries where technological progress is faster. We argued that other models of shakeouts were not able to explain this fact, whereas our vintage-capital model does so by predicting earlier replacement when capitalembodied technological progress is fast. We supported this claim with evidence from the airline industry that showed firm exits to be positively related to the age of the capital stock. By inferring technological progress in the inputs from the decline in the price of the output as our model predicted, we found that the model fits fairly well the negative relation between technological progress and the onset of the shakeout. Moreover, we found that subsequent investment spikes, too, are also more frequent where technological progress is fast. 
EXIT
denote its CDF, the likelihood is
where i = 1, 2 denote the two censored observations. Conditional Expectation in Figure 5 .-Take the Nylon observation for example. The observation is truncated at 21. As we showed in the previous paragraph,
By setting x and σ equal to their respective point estimates of -2.56 and 2.27, we obtain estimates ofT i and β NBER recessions tests.-The dates come from http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html. For both exit and entry spikes then P j φ R j / P j φ j < P j τ R j / P j τ j . The differences however are not significant at even the 10% level in chi-square tests of independence in both cases.
